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Capitalisation of government support in agricultural land prices: 
What do we know? 
Abstract  
The objective of this article is to provide an overview of existing literature, both theoretically 
and empirically, on the extent to which agricultural subsidies do translate into higher land 
values and rents and finally benefit landowners instead of agricultural producers. Our review 
shows that agricultural support policy instruments contribute to increase the rental price of 
farmland, and that the extent of this increase closely depends on the level of the supply price 
elasticity of farmland relative to those of other factors/inputs on the one hand, and on the 
range of the possibilities of factor/input substitution in agricultural production on the other 
hand. The empirical literature shows that land prices and rents have a significant positive 
response to government support, consistently less than 1. Such inelastic response is thought to 
reflect the uncertain future of the farm programs. And in general, studies have indicated that 
land prices are more responsive to government-based returns than to market-based returns. 
Keywords: farmland, price, support, capitalisation 
JEL Classification: Q18, Q15 
 
Capitalisation du soutien public dans les prix des terres agricoles : Que sait-on 
exactement ? 
Résumé 
L’article propose une revue de la littérature théorique et empirique sur la question de la 
capitalisation des subventions versées à l’agriculture dans les prix et les loyers des terres 
agricoles et, par suite, de l’éventuel transfert de ces subventions des producteurs agricoles, à 
qui elles sont destinées, vers les propriétaires terriens. Notre revue montre que les instruments 
de soutien à l’agriculture contribuent à accroître le prix de location des terres agricoles. 
L’ampleur de cette augmentation dépend étroitement i) du niveau de l’élasticité prix de l’offre 
de terre agricole par rapport à celle des autres facteurs de production, ii) des possibilités de 
substitution entre facteurs de production au sein de la technologie de production agricole. La 
littérature empirique suggère quant à elle que les prix de vente et de location des terres 
agricoles répondent significativement et positivement au soutien public, et que l’élasticité de 
cette réponse est inférieure à 1. L’inélasticité de la réponse des prix des terres agricoles au 
 4 
soutien public octroyé à l’agriculture pourrait refléter le fait que l’avenir des programmes de 
soutien agricoles est perçu comme incertain par les opérateurs des marchés. En outre, 
généralement les études existantes indiquent que les prix des terres agricoles répondent plus 
fortement à la composante soutien public, qu’à la composante gain issu de l’activité de 
production (ventes des produits). 
Mots-clés : terre agricole, prix, soutien, capitalisation 
Classification JEL : Q18, Q15 
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Capitalisation of government support in agricultural land prices: 
What do we know? 
 
1.  Introduction 
A central purpose of agricultural policies in industrialised countries is to support farmers’ 
income. Whether agricultural support actually benefits farmers however is an open question. 
Agricultural support policies raise farmers’ gross income and then contribute to increase 
returns to resources that individual farmers use. As a consequence, agricultural support 
policies contribute to increase the market prices of these resources and ultimately benefit the 
owners of these resources. Hence, whether agricultural support benefits farmers closely 
depends on whether farmers own the resources they use in production. 
Among agricultural primary factors of production (land, family labour and capital), land has 
been paid higher attention regarding this issue for at least two reasons. Firstly, in many 
industrialised countries, a substantial share of farmland is rented, sometimes from other 
farmers but also commonly from non-farmer landlords. Secondly, an increasing number of 
government payments are tied to farmland. Hence the question of the extent to which 
agricultural subsidies do translate into higher land values and rents and finally benefit 
landowners, is a critical issue. 
Concern over the capture of agricultural policy benefits by the landowners is not new. And 
the question of the capitalisation of support into farmland values and rents has a long tradition 
in Agricultural Economics. The objective of this article is to provide an overview of existing 
literature, both theoretically and empirically, on that issue. 
The article is structured as follows. The next section reviews the main insights that can be 
drawn from the theory about how agricultural support may affect farmland values and rents 
and what are the key assumptions and parameters regarding this issue. The third section 
reviews empirical evidence about the extent to which agricultural support affects farmland 
values and rents. The final section concludes. 
2.  Agricultural support does affect farmland markets and prices: Insights from the 
theory 
By which mechanisms agricultural support does affect farmland markets and prices? What are 
the main assumptions and parameters that play a key role as regards the extent of the impact 
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of agricultural support on farmland markets and prices? Who finally benefit from agricultural 
support? 
This section synthesises the main insights that can be drawn from the theory regarding these 
three questions. We focus on the relationships between agricultural support and farmland 
rental markets and prices. It is commonly assumed in existing studies that the buying and 
selling prices of farmland can be adequately approximated by the discounted sum of future 
rental prices, so that a prediction about the direction of the rental prices is equivalent to a 
prediction about the direction of the buying and selling prices. As a result most theoretical 
work has focused on the rental price of farmland. We concentrate on two types of policy 
instruments: output price support and land subsidy. These two instruments have been selected 
because they reflect the evolution of agricultural policies in most industrialised countries over 
the last decade, where output price support has been progressively replaced by direct 
payments linked to production factors, especially land. 
The main insights that can be drawn from theory on the effects of output price support on 
farmland rental markets and prices are first reviewed. Then, we focus on what we know from 
the theory about the effects of factor (especially land) subsidies. In both cases, using very 
simple frameworks, the main mechanisms that underlie the effects of policy instruments are 
described by the mean of a graphical analysis. 
2.1.  Output price support and farmland rental markets and prices 
One paper extensively cited in the existing literature is Floyd (1965). This seminal paper 
shows, using a rather simple analytical model, that: i) output price support affects the prices 
of production factors1; ii) the extent of the impact of output price support on factor prices 
closely depends on the elasticities of supply of factors (that is the extent of factor mobility 
within the economy) and on agricultural production technology (that is, specifically, the 
extent of factor substitution possibilities); iii) output control programs (through production 
quota or acreage restriction) modify the effect of output price support on factor prices, either 
by creating a new fixed production factor (production rights) in the case of quota, or by 
changing the opportunity cost of land in the case of acreage restriction. 
A number of papers have re-examined in alternative ways Floyd’s results or extended them by 
relaxing restrictive hypotheses of Floyd’s model and/or including various alternative policy 
                                                 
1 In this paper the term ‘production factors’ refer to land, family labour and capital, while the term ‘inputs’ 
designate all other (variable) inputs such as hired labour, energy, fertiliser, pesticides, etc. 
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instruments in order to compare their respective effects (e.g., Gardner, 1987; Hertel, 1989; 
1991; Leathers, 1992; Dewbre et al., 2001; Dewbre and Short, 2002; OECD, 2002; Guyomard 
et al., 2004). Usually however, although analytical results are much more complicated and 
effects of policy instruments more difficult to disentangle, interpret and sign, main insights 
from Floyd’s model do remain. 
The one output-one factor case: Illustrating the key role of factor supply elasticity 
Let’s consider a representative farmer using one factor (which may be land) in quantity l  to 
produce an aggregate agricultural output in quantity y , according to a given production 
technology ( )(lfy = ). Figure 1 depicts the domestic output and factor markets in the 
considered country. On the output market, )( yy pD  is the domestic demand while ),(
0
lyy ppS  
is the initial domestic supply. Both the domestic demand and supply depend on the domestic 
output price yp . The initial output supply also depends on the initial equilibrium price of the 
factor 0lp . Let’s assume that the considered country is a small country for the output y . 
Hence, at initial equilibrium, domestic output price is 0yp  corresponding to the exogenous 
world price. The representative farmer produces quantity 0y , which is partly consumed 
domestically and partly exported. On the factor market, ),( 0yll ppD  is the initial domestic 
derived demand, as a function of the factor price and the initial output price, while )( ll pS  is 
the domestic factor supply. On panel 1.b this factor supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic 
in quantity 0l  ( l  is a specific factor to agriculture), while in panel 1.c it is assumed as 
perfectly elastic at price 0lp . Let’s assume that the factor is not traded. Hence, in both cases, 
at initial equilibrium, domestic demand equals domestic supply at price 0lp  and quantity 
0l . 
Let’s imagine that the government decides to support the farmer’s income through output 
price support. Hence the output price increases to 1yp .
2 In a first step, this output price 
increase is an incentive for the farmer to produce more. Other things being equal, the farmer 
                                                 
2  This output price support may be provided through a fixed support price or a fixed (ad-valorem or specific) 
output subsidy. Such alternative instruments would have different impacts for domestic consumers and in terms 
of net welfare loss for the considered country but not for the representative farmer, nor on the factor market. As 
we are only interested in the farmer’s situation in conjunction with the impact of output price support on the 
factor market, we do not specify which type of instrument is used. 
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would seek to produce 1y . However, such an output supply increase would require to use 
more factor. This factor adjustment requirement is depicted through the shift in the derived 
demand curve from ),( 0yll ppD  to ),(
1
yll ppD  on the factor market. At this stage one can 
guess the key role of the factor supply elasticity: 
- In panel 1.b, as the factor supply is perfectly inelastic (i.e., there is no additional 
quantity of factor available), this factor demand increase translates into a factor price 
increase from 0lp  to 
1
lp . The resulting increase in the marginal cost of y  is depicted 
on panel 1.a through the shift of the output supply curve from ),( 0lyy ppS  to 
),( 1lyy ppS . Finally, figure 1 shows that, following the induced price adjustment on 
the factor market, the final equilibrium output quantity is unchanged at 0y . 
- In panel 1.c, as the factor supply is perfectly elastic (i.e., at price 0lp  there is no 
restriction on available quantity of the factor), the factor demand increase does not 
affect the factor price, which remains at 0lp  level. Hence, the marginal cost of y  is 
unchanged. Factor demand and output supply increase simultaneously, to 1y  and 1l  
respectively. 
Finally, if we consider that the factor in figure 1 is land, this figure illustrates the key role of 
the land supply price elasticity as regards the effect of output price support on the rental price 
of land: if this elasticity is very low, output price support is nearly totally “capitalised” in the 
rental price of land, while if this elasticity is very high, output price support has nearly no 
effect on the rental price of land. In other words, the lower the land supply price elasticity, the 
higher the share of output price support “capitalised” in the rental price of land. In that case, if 
the owner of the factor is the farmer, then the price support policy actually contributes to 
supporting the farmer’s income. At reverse, if the owner of the factor is not the farmer, but an 
individual who is outside the agricultural sector, the price support policy completely misses 
its initial objective since the provided support “leaves” the agricultural sector. Furthermore, 
by contributing to increase the price of the factor, the price support policy increases the cost 
of setting-up for future farmers. Finally, not only the price support policy misses its initial 
target group (the current farmers) but it might also contribute to worsen the situation of future 
farmers. 
 Figure 1. Effects of output price support on domestic output and factor markets: the one-factor case
1.a. Output market 1.b. Factor market 
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The one output-two factor case: Illustrating the key role of factor substitution possibilities 
Let’s assume now that our representative farmer produces an aggregate agricultural output by 
combining two factors, according to a given production technology ( ),( xlfy = ). The first 
factor is land and is used in quantity l . The second factor may be an aggregate of family 
labour and capital and is used in quantity x . Figure 2 depicts the domestic output and factor 
markets in the considered country. 
Notations are similar to the previous case. Panel 2.b describes the domestic land rental 
market. We assume that the land supply is imperfectly elastic and, consequently, increasing in 
the rental price of land. Panel 2.c depicts the domestic market of the other factor. The 
domestic supply of this other factor is assumed to be perfectly elastic in 0xp . On panel 2.a 
output supply now depends on the output price and on both factor prices. On panels 2.b and 
2.c, derived demands of factors also depend on the output price and on both factor prices. 
Therefore, ),,( 00 xlyy pppS  is the initial output supply curve, while ),,(
00
yxll pppD  and 
),,( 00 ylxx pppD  are the initial derived demand curves of land and of the other factor 
respectively. 
All other assumptions adopted in the previous case are still valid here. At initial equilibrium 
the domestic output price is 0yp , the representative farmer produces quantity 
0y , using 
quantity 0l  of land and quantity 0x  of the other factor. The initial rental price of land is 0lp , 
while the initial price of the other factor is 0xp . 
As in the previous case, we assume that, following the implementation of an output price 
support policy, the output price increases to 1yp . In a first step, this output price increase is an 
incentive for the farmer to produce more. Other things being equal, the farmer would seek to 
produce 1y . However, such an output supply increase would require to use larger quantities 
of factors. This is at this stage that the key role of substitution possibilities between both 
factors appears. 
- Let’s consider first the case where both factors are highly substitutable. As the supply 
of factor x  is perfectly elastic, an increase in its derived demand would have no 
impact on its initial equilibrium price. While as the supply of land is imperfectly 
elastic, an increase in its derived demand would lead the land rental price to increase 
relative to its initial equilibrium level. Therefore, in the new output price context, the 
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representative farmer who wants to increase his/her output quantity has incentive to 
change his/her factor quantity ratio in favour of factor x , trying to keep nearly 
unchanged his/her use of land. Such a situation is represented in panels 2.b and 2.c by 
the small shift to the right of the derived demand of land (from ),,( 00 yxll pppD  to 
),,( 10 yxl
sub
l pppD ) and the large shift to the right of the derived demand of factor x  
(from ),,( 00 ylxx pppD  to ),,(
11
y
sub
lx
sub
x pppD ). Hence, at final equilibrium, the farmer 
produces quantity suby1  using quantity subl1  of land and quantity subx1  of the other 
factor. In this case, factor prices are nearly unchanged (one observes only a slight 
increase in the rental price of land from 0lp  to 
sub
lp
1 ) with respect to the initial 
equilibrium. 
- Let’s consider now the situation where land and the other factor are hardly 
substitutable. In that case, the representative farmer is more constrained in the 
adjustment of his/her factor quantity ratio in favour of factor x . This more constrained 
factor substitution process is illustrated in panels 2.b and 2.c by the shift to the right of 
similar extent of the derived demands of land and factor x  (from ),,( 00 yxll pppD  to 
),,( 10 yxl
nsub
l pppD  and from ),,(
00
ylxx pppD  to ),,(
11
y
nsub
lx
nsub
x pppD  respectively). 
Hence, at final equilibrium, the representative farmer produces quantity nsuby1  (lower 
than suby1  due to the higher increase in the rental price of land), using quantity nsubl1  of 
land and quantity nsubx1  (lower than subx1  due to the lower factor substitution 
possibilities) of the other factor. In this case, the rental price of land increases more 
than in the previous situation ( nsublp
1  is greater than sublp
1 ). In other words, when land 
and the other factor are less substitutable in production, a larger share of output price 
support is “capitalised” in the rental price of land. 
Finally, figure 2 shows that the effects of output price support on the output and both factor 
markets are quite different, according to the degree of factor substitution possibilities in 
production (i.e., the level of the elasticity of substitution between factors) on the one hand, 
and the relative level of both factor supply elasticities on the other hand. Regarding the impact 
of output price support on land rental market and price, one may synthesise the main findings 
as follows. The lower the supply price elasticity of land, the higher the supply price elasticity 
of the other factor and the lower the substitution elasticity between land and the other factor: 
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- The higher the increase in the rental price of land and the higher the share of output 
price support “capitalised” in the rental price of land. 
- The higher the increase in the production cost of the output (and the lower the positive 
effect of output price support on output quantity supply). 
- The lower the gain for the farmer in terms of increased surplus and the higher the 
share of output price support transferred to the landowner. 
- On an intergenerational basis, the higher the increase in the cost of setting-up and the 
worst the situation for future farmers. 
As shown by Floyd (1965), Gisser (1993) and Hertel (1989) for instance, these results may be 
generalised for the multi-factor/input case, using a Cobb-Douglas or a constant elasticity of 
supply (CES) production function and under the constant return to scale assumption. 
Finally, the above analysis suggests that when one is interested in the impact of agricultural 
output price support policies on land rental markets and prices, the main parameters to 
consider and work on are the supply price elasticities of agricultural production factors and 
inputs as well as the elasticities of substitution in production between these factors and inputs. 
2.2.  Factor subsidies and farmland rental markets and prices 
Several papers compare the effects, on output and factor/input markets as well as sometimes 
on farmers’ income, of various alternative agricultural support policy instruments. Most often 
considered policy instruments are various kinds of output price support, various kinds of input 
and/or factor subsidies and various kinds of decoupled payments. It is then possible to extract 
from these analyses some theoretical insights about the effects of factor/input subsidies on 
farmland rental markets and prices (see e.g., Hertel, 1989; 1991; Dewbre et al., 2001; Dewbre 
and Short, 2002; OECD, 2002; Guyomard et al., 2004). All available analytical results show 
that the main mechanisms by which support provided to farmers through input/factor 
subsidies affect farmland rental markets and prices are similar to those described previously 
in the case of output price support policy. And once again, these results indicate that the key 
factors regarding the extent of the effects of input/factor subsidies on farmland rental markets 
and prices are the relative levels of supply price elasticities of inputs and factors as well as the 
extent of input/factor substitution possibilities in production. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Effects of output price support on domestic output and factor markets: the two-factor case 
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The one output-one factor case: Illustrating the key role of factor supply elasticity 
Let’s return to our previous one-factor framework. All assumptions and notations initially 
adopted remain, except for the policy instrument considered to support the representative 
farmer’s income: we assume now that this instrument is a factor subsidy (or a payment based 
on factor use). As depicted on figure 3, initially the farmer uses quantity 0l  of the factor that 
he/she buys on the factor market at price 0lp  (or at opportunity cost 
0
lp ) and produces 
quantity 0y  of output that he/she sells on the output market at exogenous (world) price 0yp . 
The first incidence of the factor subsidy is to decrease the buying-in price (or the opportunity 
cost) of the factor for the farmer. This first incidence is represented on panels 3.b and 3.c by 
the decrease in the price of the factor “paid” by the farmer from 0lp  to ll sp −
0 , where ls  is 
the factor subsidy.3 This reduction in the buying-in price of the factor makes the farmer’s 
marginal cost of output production to decrease. On panel 3.a this induced decrease in the 
marginal cost of production is depicted by the shift to the right of the output supply curve 
from ),( 0lyy ppS  to ),(
0
llyy sppS − . Hence, at first stage, the factor subsidy generates an 
incentive for the farmer to increase his/her output supply: other things being equal, the farmer 
would seek to produce 1y . However, such an output supply increase would require to use 
more factor. From this stage, induced adjustments on the output and factor market differ 
according to whether the factor supply is totally inelastic or elastic. 
- In panel 3.b, as the factor supply is perfectly inelastic, the farmer cannot adjust his/her 
factor use up to the quantity 1l  corresponding to output quantity 1y . Then the factor 
adjustment requirement translates into a shift to the right of the factor derived demand 
curve from ),( 0yll ppD  to ),(
0
yl
sl
l ppD . This factor demand increase translates into a 
rise of both the market price (from 0lp  to 
1
lp ) and the buying-in price (from ll sp −
0  to 
lll spp −=
10 ) of the factor. The resulting increase in the marginal cost of y  is 
depicted on panel 3.a through the shift back to the left of the output supply curve from 
),( 0 llyy sppS −  to ),(
10
lllyy spppS −= . Finally, figure 3 shows that, following the 
                                                 
3 The subsidy is assumed to be of the specific form, meaning that it is a total amount per unit of factor used. This 
kind of subsidy is similar to, and may be interpreted as, a payment based on factor use. Main results of our 
graphical analysis would remain valid in the case of an ad-valorem subsidy, that is a subsidy that would be 
defined as a percentage share of the initial equilibrium market price of the factor. 
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induced price adjustment on the factor market, the final equilibrium output quantity is 
unchanged at 0y . 
- In panel 3.c, as the factor supply is perfectly elastic, the farmer can adjust his/her 
factor use quantity without affecting the market price nor his/her buying-in price of 
the factor (which remain at 0lp  and ll sp −
0  respectively). Hence, following the factor 
subsidy implementation, factor demand and output supply increase simultaneously, to 
1y  and 1l  respectively.  
Finally, figure 3 shows that the effects of the factor subsidy on both the output and factor 
markets are quite different according to the level of the factor supply elasticity. Figure 3 also 
suggests that the market effects of the factor subsidy are rather similar to those of the output 
price support as described previously.4 Assuming that the considered factor is land, the lower 
the land supply price elasticity the higher the share of the land subsidy “capitalised” in the 
rental price of land. 
                                                 
4 This is not so surprising in our simplified one output-one factor framework. Indeed, one guesses that, knowing 
the form of the production function, it may be quite easy to transform output price support into an equivalent 
factor subsidy and reversely. Existing theoretical literature shows however that if using more sophisticated 
frameworks actually makes the analysis more complex and the effects of policy instruments more ambiguous, it 
adds no new intuition: factor supply price elasticities do remain key parameters as regards the extent of the 
impact of agricultural support policy instruments on the rental price of farmland, as well as on prices of other 
factors and inputs, output produced and factor/input use quantities, and finally farmers income. 
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Figure 3. Effects of a factor subsidy on domestic output and factor markets: the one-factor case 
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The one output-two factor case: Illustrating the key role of factor substitution possibilities 
Let’s return to the case depicted by figure 2. We change only two assumptions. Firstly, the 
considered support policy instrument is no longer output price support but a land subsidy. 
Secondly, the supply of the other factor is now assumed to be imperfectly elastic. Therefore, 
the supply curve of this other factor is increasing in its price, as shown on figure 4, panel 4.c. 
Figure 4 indicates that at initial equilibrium, the domestic output price is 0yp , and the 
representative farmer produces quantity 0y , using quantity 0l  of land and quantity 0x  of the 
other factor. The initial rental price of land is 0lp , while the initial price of the other factor is 
0
xp . 
As in the above case, described by figure 3, the first incidence of the land subsidy is to 
decrease the buying-in price (or the opportunity cost) of land for the farmer. This first 
incidence is represented on panel 4.b by the decrease in the price “paid” by the farmer from 
0
lp  to 
1
ldp . This price decrease induces a rise in the farmer’s land demand (from 
0l  to 1l ) that, 
due to the relative scarcity of available land, implies an increase in the market (or supply) 
rental price of land up to 1lsp . As a result, the land subsidy generates a gap between the 
demand and the supply rental prices of land (i.e., lldls spp =−
11 ). Following the reduction in 
the buying-in price of land, the farmer’s marginal cost of production is going to decrease, 
inducing a shift to the right of the output supply curve. However, this shift is not represented 
on panel 4.a at this stage because its extent closely depends on the range of substitution 
possibilities between land and the other factor. 
- Let’s consider first the case where land and the other factor are highly substitutable. 
As the land subsidy makes the buying-in price of land to decrease, the farmer has 
incentive to substitute land to factor x  in the production process. The available 
technology allowing such factor substitution adjustment, the derived demand of factor 
x  starts to decrease (the demand curve of factor x  shifts to the left on panel 4.c). 
However, as the supply of factor x  is imperfectly elastic, the price of factor x  starts 
to adjust down, slowing down the substitution process between land and factor x . 
Hence, at last a new equilibrium is reached where, as shown by panels 4.b and 4.c, 
both derived demand curves have shifted to the left due to factor price adjustment 
interactions (from ),,( 00 yxll pppD  to ),,(
01
y
sub
xl
sub
l pppD  for land and from 
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),,( 00 ylxx pppD  to ),,(
01
y
sub
ldx
sub
x pppD  for factor x ). As both the buying-in price of 
land and the price of factor x  have decreased following the land subsidy 
implementation, the farmer’s marginal cost of production has lowered from the initial 
to the final equilibrium. Hence, on panel 4.a the final output supply curve is 
),,( 11 subx
sub
ldyy pppS . Therefore in this case the land subsidy induces an increase in 
output quantity from 0y  to suby1 . This new equilibrium output quantity is obtained by 
combining an increased quantity of land (from 0l  to subl1 ) and a decreased quantity of 
factor x  (from 0x  to subx1 ). 
- Let’s now consider the situation where land and the other factor are hardly 
substitutable. In order to simplify the analysis and keep figure 4 readable, we assume 
that land and factor x  are complementary. In such case, the first increase in land 
demand following the land subsidy implementation is accompanied by a simultaneous 
increase in the demand of factor x  (since both factors are complementary). Hence, on 
factor x ’s market the price starts to rise. This price increase acts as to slow down, 
firstly the increase in both factor demands, secondly the lowering of the farmer’s 
marginal production cost (following the decrease in the buying-in price of land) and 
finally the expansion of output supply. Hence, at last a new equilibrium is reached 
where on panel 4.a the final output supply curve is ),,( 11 nsubx
nsub
ldyy pppS  and the output 
quantity nsuby1 . This latter is lower than suby1  essentially because, contrary to the 
above “substitution case”, the complementarity between land and factor x  in 
production prevents the farmer from exploiting fully the decrease in the buying-in 
price of land by substituting cheaper land to relatively more expensive factor x . As a 
result the marginal cost of production decreases less in the “complementarity case” 
than in the “substitution case”. For the same reason, the new equilibrium quantity use 
of land nsubl1  is lower than the one observed in the “substitution case”, but still higher 
than the initial level 0l  (cf. panel 4.b). However, contrary to the “substitution case”, 
the factor complementarity relationship makes the land subsidy induce an increase in 
the quantity use of factor x  (from 0x  to nsubx1  on panel 4.c). 
Finally, figure 4 shows that the effects of a land subsidy may be quite different according to 
the degree of factor substitution possibilities in production. First of all, figure 4 indicates that 
a land subsidy may induce a decrease, no change or an increase in the quantity used and the 
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market price of the non-land factors/inputs, depending on the range of substitution 
possibilities between land and non-land factors/inputs, from strong substitutes to 
complements. Secondly, figure 4 shows that, while the land subsidy unambiguously induces 
an increase in the output supply quantity, the extent of this increase closely depends on the 
degree of land and non-land factor/input substitution in production: the higher the substitution 
possibilities, the greater the output supply increase. Thirdly, figure 4 indicates that, while the 
land subsidy unambiguously induces an increase in the rental market price of land, a decrease 
in the corresponding buying-in price for the farmer and an increase in the land use quantity, 
the extent of these adjustments closely depends on the land to non-land factor/input 
substitution possibilities: the higher the substitution possibilities, the greater the increase in 
both the land use quantity and the rental market price of land. 
It is interesting to point out at this stage that the overall support provided through the land 
subsidy is shared between the farmer, the landowner and the non-land factor/input supplier. 
Whatever the factor substitution possibilities, both the farmer and the landowner experience a 
gain resulting from, respectively, the decrease in the buying-in price of land and the increase 
of its market price. The gain for both agents is however greater when land and non-land 
factors/inputs are strong substitutes in production, since in that case the benefit of support is 
not shared with the non-land factor/input supplier. Indeed in that case the non-land 
factor/input supplier may experience a loss, part of his/her surplus being transferred to the 
farmer via the decrease in the non-land factor/input price and to the landowner via the 
stronger increase in derived demand on the land rental market. At reverse and as shown by 
figure 4, when land and non-land factors/inputs are complements in production, the non-land 
factor/input supplier may experience a gain that reduces the benefit for the farmer and the 
landowner. 
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Figure 4. Effects of a land subsidy on domestic output and factor markets: the two-factor case
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Finally, as regards the impact of the land subsidy on land rental market and price, one may 
synthesise the main findings as follows. 
For given supply price elasticities of land and non-land factors/inputs, the higher the 
substitution elasticity between land and non-land factors/inputs: 
- The higher the increase in the rental market price of land and, thus, the higher the 
amount of support “capitalised” in the rental price of land. 
- The greater the decrease in the production cost of the output (and the higher the 
positive effect of the land subsidy on output supply quantity). 
- The higher the gain for the farmer in terms of increased surplus and the higher the 
amount of support transferred to the landowner. 
Comparing the effects of both the output price support and the land subsidy instruments one 
may draw the main following insights (still for given supply price elasticities of land and non-
land factors/inputs): 
- Both instruments are expected to increase output supply, and for both instruments the 
higher the degree of substitution between land and non-land factors/inputs, the greater 
the extent of the output increase. 
- Both instruments are expected to increase land use and land rental price. For the 
output price support instrument, the higher the degree of substitution between land and 
non-land factors/inputs, the lower the extent of land use and land rental price 
increases. At reverse, for the land subsidy instrument, the higher the degree of 
substitution the greater the extent of land use and land rental price increases. The main 
reason for this reverse impact of the substitution possibilities lies in the differentiated 
first incidences of both instruments. The first incidence of the output price support 
instrument is to generate an incentive for the farmer to increase output supply. As 
expanding output requires using more factors/inputs, this first incidence then spreads 
within all factor and input markets. And the higher the substitution possibilities 
between factors/inputs, the greater the dilution of support across factors/inputs. In 
other words the higher the substitution possibilities, the less the support is allowed to 
concentrate on one specific factor or input (in our example, land). At reverse, the first 
incidence of the land subsidy is to decrease the buying-in price of land for the farmer. 
Hence, in this case the support initially concentrates on land and then spreads within 
the output and other factor/input markets. But the higher the substitution possibilities 
 22 
between land and non-land factors/inputs, the more the farmer can increase his/her 
land use and consequently the less the support is allowed to spread within non-land 
markets. 
The previous graphical analysis does not allow to conclude about the comparative effect on 
output supply of the same amount of support given through either the output price support or 
the land subsidy instrument. However, Hertel (1989), Dewbre et al. (2001) and Guyomard et 
al. (2004), using different frameworks (and hence different assumptions), have obtained some 
analytical results to this regards. 
- Under constant return to scale assumption, perfectly elastic supplies of non-land inputs 
and imperfectly elastic land supply, Hertel (1989) shows that an input subsidy will 
have greater impact on output supply than an equal cost output subsidy, provided the 
subsidised input substitutes for land. Contrary to our case, the subsidised input in 
Hertel’s study is not land but a non-land input with a perfectly elastic supply. And this 
is exactly because the subsidy is applied to an input with perfectly elastic supply, that 
Hertel obtains the above presented result. 
- In Dewbre et al. (2001) the subsidy is alternatively applied to land and non-land inputs 
and the supply of both categories of inputs may be perfectly/imperfectly elastic or 
perfectly inelastic. Under assumptions of constant return to scale and small country, 
Dewbre et al. show that market price support will have greater impact on output 
supply than an equal cost land subsidy (or payment based on area) if the elasticity of 
supply of land is lower than that of the non-land inputs. 
- In a more general framework (no constant return to scale assumption, no small country 
assumption, free entry and exit in the agricultural sector) Guyomard et al. (2004) show 
that an output subsidy will unambiguously have greater impact on output supply than 
an equal cost land subsidy. The authors also demonstrate that an output subsidy will 
unambiguously have lower impact on land rental price than an equal cost land subsidy. 
In other words, and conform to the intuition that arises from our previous graphical 
analysis, a larger part of support is “capitalised” in the rental price of land when this 
support is provided through a land subsidy than through output price support. 
At this stage, it is interesting to point out that the current evolution of agricultural policies in 
most industrialised countries is likely to reinforce the capitalisation of support in the farmland 
rental price. Indeed, according to Guyomard et al.’s result, the decapitalisation of support that 
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should follow the decrease in the support based on output should be more than 
counterbalanced by the intensification of capitalisation of support that should follow the 
increase in support based on area. Of course, there are a lot of other factors that can influence 
the evolution of farmland rental prices in industrialised countries (such as legal factors for 
instance, see e.g., OECD, 1996; Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2006). In addition, the land subsidy 
as designed in Guyomard et al. (2004) and in this paper does not fit the much more complex 
area payment systems that some countries have actually implemented. However, this is a 
matter of fact that the current evolution of agricultural policies in industrialised countries 
mainly consists in replacing market price support instruments through which the support is 
based on output and likely to “capitalise” less in farmland rental prices, by direct payment 
systems through which the support is most often (explicitly or implicitly) based on area and 
likely to “capitalise” more in farmland rental prices. 
3.  Empirical review 
3.1.  A methodological note 
Empirical estimations of farmland price formation 
In the mid-60’s the common approach to farmland pricing was to use a supply-demand 
framework with the quantity of land supplied for sale as an ad-hoc function of the price of 
land and other variables (urban pressure for example) and the demand for land as an ad-hoc 
function of the price of land and other variables (such as net farm income or productivity 
increase for example) (e.g. Herdt and Cochrane, 1966; Tweeten and Martin, 1966; Reynolds 
and Timmons, 1969; Cowling et al., 1970). Harvey (1974) pointed out however that such an 
approach is theoretically incorrect for two reasons. Firstly, there is not a stable relationship 
between the number of transactions and the supply of or demand for land. Given that 
transactions merely restore equilibrium, a given price may be associated with a large number 
of transactions or no transactions. Secondly, the same factors (farm incomes, riskiness, capital 
gains prospects, etc.) cause shifts in both the supply and the demand functions. Therefore, 
their separate influences cannot be identified. Due to these theoretical and other empirical 
unresolved problems, following studies focused exclusively on the role of demand side forces.  
For this, most studies have relied on the present value model (PVM). This model stipulates 
that the price of an income-earning asset is equal to the discounted expected value of the 
stream of future net returns or rents to this asset. Hence, according to the PVM, the price of 
farmland should be driven essentially by the discounted expected value of the stream of future 
 24 
net returns to farming or rents. Assuming that the value of an income-producing asset is the 
capitalised value of the current and future stream of earnings from owning this asset, the 
equilibrium asset price at the beginning of time period t (Lt) may be written as: 
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where Rt is the net real return at the end of time period t, generated from owning the asset, rt 
is the time varying real discount rate for year t and E is the expectation on return conditional 
on information in period t.  
If it is assumed that the net return is constant in each period (R*), that the discount rate is 
constant, that agents are risk neutral and that differential tax treatments of capital gains and 
rental income are ignored, then equation [1] simplifies to the basic capitalisation formula:  
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This basic capitalisation formula underlies most of the studies concerned with farmland price 
formation, with Lt as farmland value or price and Rt as the real net return to farmland (most 
often measured by net farm income or some -cash- rent). However, equation [2] is derived 
under very restrictive assumptions and actually most of existing studies used refined versions 
of the basic capitalisation formula, that were obtained in much more flexible frameworks. 
Major modifications of the basic capitalisation formula were: introducing the growth in 
earnings from land (Melichar, 1979; Baker et al., 1991), allowing for differential tax 
treatment of income and capital gains (Alston, 1986; Burt, 1986), and considering the role of 
inflation (Feldstein, 1980). Other refinements comprised accounting for credit market 
imperfections (Shalit and Schmitz, 1982), modifying the expectation schemes (Lloyd et al., 
1991; Just and Miranowski, 1993), incorporating risk and risk aversion (Chavas and Jones, 
1993), including transaction costs (Shiha and Chavas, 1995), and taking into account potential 
returns from non-agricultural uses (Robison et al., 1985; Plantiga and Miller, 2001; Plantiga et 
al., 2002). 
A number of studies using co-integration techniques questioned the empirical finding, based 
on the PVM, that net real returns are the major factor explaining land values (Campbell and 
Shiller, 1987; Falk, 1991; Hallam et al., 1992; Clark et al., 1993). If the PVM is correct, then 
land rents and land prices should have the same time series properties, and the spread, defined 
as the stationary linear relationship between land rents and prices, should add useful 
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information in forecasting future changes in rents given past changes in rents. A number of 
studies tested for two main reasons of rejection of the PVM: time-varying discount rates 
(Falk, 1992; Hanson and Myers, 1995) and the presence of speculative bubbles (Featherstone 
and Baker, 1988; Tegene and Kuchler, 1993; Falk and Lee, 1998). Following this literature, 
co-integration testing has become a routine in many studies, as a preliminary step before the 
empirical application of the PVM. 
Empirical investigation of the capitalisation of public support 
Capitalisation of public support in farmland prices has been mostly investigated with the help 
of the PVM, by separating the return to land (R) into two sources of income: a market-based 
source and a government-based source. This method has been applied as such (Goodwin and 
Ortalo-Magné, 1992; Clark et al., 1993; Clark et al., 1993) or by specifying different discount 
rates (r) for the two sources of income (Weersink et al., 1999; Duvivier et al., 2005). Two 
studies have accounted for the counter-cyclical nature of government payments, that is to say 
the inverse relationship between these payments and the land returns, by adding an equation 
explaining the amount of the payments as a function of several determinants including the 
returns to land (Shaik et al., 2005; Shaik et al., 2006). In many studies the basic PVM has 
been modified in the same lines as explained above: assuming time-varying rates (Vantreese 
et al., 1989; Cavailhès and Degoud, 1995; Weersink et al., 1999; Flanders et al., 2004), 
treating expectations with various schemes (Cavailhès and Degoud, 1995; Duvivier et al., 
2005; Goodwin et al., 2005), accounting for alternative land uses (Goodwin et al., 2003 and 
2005). Several studies have also econometrically tested the appropriateness of the PVM 
(Weersink et al., 1999; Flanders et al., 2004, Duvivier et al., 2005). 
The investigation of the issue has, however, not always relied on the PVM approach. A few 
studies based their investigation on the hedonic pricing approach (Barnard et al., 1997; ERS 
USDA, 2001b; Taylor and Brester, 2005). This approach, standard in consumer research and 
environmental valuation, was firstly applied to land by Palmquist (1989). The interpretation 
of the hedonic function is that observed prices of a product are explained by a vector of 
specific amounts of quality components. In practice however, the components entering the 
hedonic function are usually chosen without theoretical justification; government payments 
are thus among these components. Finally, the investigation of the effect of agricultural policy 
on land rents has often been carried out using the agricultural producer’s framework, that is to 
say maximising farmers’ profit, that includes rentals (Lence and Mishra, 2003; Roberts et al., 
2003). 
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3.2.  Empirical results from the literature 
While some studies have simply given evidence of the capitalisation of public support without 
quantifying it (Clark et al., 1993; Cavailhès and Degoud, 1995; Flanders et al., 2004), this 
article focuses on the quantitative results from the studies, that is to say the extent of 
capitalisation. This is assessed in terms of the responsiveness of the land values with respect 
to the support, and of the share of land value that can be attributed to Farm programs. Farm 
programs cover both income support (through market price support, output or factor/input 
subsidies or direct government payments for instance) and output supply or input use control 
(production quota or acreage restrictions for example). Most studies existing in the literature 
investigated the capitalisation of direct government payments, whether total or several types 
of payments. All findings are summarised in table 1. 
Responsiveness of the land values with respect to the support 
Only one study reported the effect of one additional dollar of payment on land prices:  
Goodwin et al. (2005) found that usually one dollar of government payment resulted in an 
increase of 13.44 dollars of land price in the US. Studies about the effect of one additional 
dollar of payment on land rents found an increase of less than one dollar of rental (Lence and 
Mishra, 2003; Roberts et al., 2003; Goodwin et al., 2005) in the US in the second half of the 
90es (except for Roberts et al., 2003). As indicated by some authors, this dilution can be 
explained by the fact that, in the case of some support programs, farmers have to fulfil some 
requirements such as set-asides which imply reduced income. Cross-compliance requirements 
might also decrease farm income by imposing maintenance costs. Rutherford et al. (1990) 
also gave evidence of this dilution effect using a General Equilibrium model of global trade in 
wheat calibrated with 1981 data. The authors forecasted that the capitalisation rate of the US 
wheat price support program was 25%, meaning that 75% of the capitalisation was diluted. 
They explained this result by the conditionality of the support: set-aside requirements imply 
additional costs for participants, which might offset the benefit of the support. 
One must underline here that, at least for farmland rental prices, theoretical insights presented 
in the previous section clearly show that, even in the absence of set-aside or cross-compliance 
requirements, such dilution of support commonly arises since only very specific assumptions 
on the land supply price elasticity, on the relative levels of factors and inputs supply price 
elasticities and on factors/inputs substitution possibilities are required for one dollar of 
support is totally “capitalised” in farmland rental price. 
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Numerous studies report elasticity estimates of land prices with respect to public farm 
programs. And all of them found an estimate less than one (Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné, 
1992; Barnard et al., 1997; Wersink et al., 1999; Duvivier et al., 2005; Taylor and Brester, 
2005; Shaik et al., 2005; Latruffe et al., 2006; Shaik et al., 2006), whether the analysis was for 
the US, Canada, France, Belgium or the Czech Republic, in the 80es, 90es, or second half of 
the century. This inelastic response could be explained by the way agents discount the 
government payments. Were the latter seen as transitory, they would be heavily discounted, 
implying a lower elasticity of response. The agents would however discount less heavily 
payments that they would consider permanently available. In other words, if agents have 
doubts about the certainty of farm programs, land prices will be lower than if payments were 
to continue indefinitely. Schmitz (1995) was the first one to highlight this uncertainty issue, 
by showing that Ricardian rents (including government payments) and wealth did not bear a 
one-to-one relationship for the Canadian Prairie region in 1982-1986. By contrast, Weersink 
et al. (1999) found that in Ontario during 1947-1993 government payments were less heavily 
discounted than market returns: the former were thus considered as more stable by farmers. 
Studies usually concord regarding the comparison of responsiveness with respect to 
government payments and to market-based returns. Most of the analyses having investigated 
this issue show that land prices are more responsive to the former than to the latter (Goodwin 
et al., 2005; Duvivier et al., 2005; Taylor and Brester, 2005; Latruffe et al., 2006; Shaik et al., 
2006). Two studies found the opposite (Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné, 1992; Shaik et al., 
2005), but Weersink et al. (1999) showed that it was actually in the long run that land prices 
were more responsive to government payments than to market-based returns, while the 
reciprocal was true in the short run. 
Share of land value that can be attributed to the support 
Only studies in the US have investigated the share of land price that can be attributed to 
public programs (Vantreese et al., 1989; Just and Miranowski, 1993; ERS USDA, 2001a and 
2001b; Shaik et al., 2005; Shaik et al., 2006). Despite the difference in the type of program 
(all government payments, crop direct payments only, burley tobacco quotas), studies 
consistently report that a substantial share of land prices is due to government payments: in 
general between 12% and 40%, with peaks at 4% (total government payments in 1970-1979; 
ERS USDA, 2001a) and 67% (total government payments in the US Southern states during 
the last Farm Bill; Shaik et al., 2006). 
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Table 1: Summary of the studies having investigated empirically the extent of capitalisation 
Study Region studied Period studied Approach Program investigated Findings * 
Vantreese et al. 
(1989) 
Kentucky 1973-1985 PVM with varying discount 
rate 
Burley tobacco quota in 
pounds per acre 
Share 12-39% 
Goodwin and Ortalo-
Magné (1992) 
US Kansas and North 
Dakota, Canada Manitoba 
and Saskatchewan, France 
regions Centre and 
Picardie 
1979-1989 PVM Wheat PSE Elasticity 0.38 
Clark, Klein and 
Thompson (1993) 
Canada; Saskatchewan 1950-1987 PVM Direct and indirect 
subsidies for grain 
Evidence of 
capitalisation 
Just and Miranowski 
(1993) 
US 1963-1986 PVM with wealth 
accumulation, debt, taxation, 
naive expectations 
Total government 
payments 
Share 15-25% 
Cavailhès and 
Degoud (1995) 
France 1961-1993 Basic PVM; PVM with 
adaptive expectations and 
varying discount rate 
1992 CAP reform Evidence of 
capitalisation 
Barnard et al. (1997) 20 US Land Resource 
Regions 
1994-1996 Ad-hoc regression Direct government 
payments 
Elasticity 0.12-0.69 
depending on region 
Weersink et al. (1999) Ontario 1947-1993 PVM with varying and 
different discount rates 
Direct government 
payments 
Elasticity: 
Short-run 0.009 
Long-run 0.625 
ERS USDA (2001a) US 1972-2001 PVM Government payments Share: 
4% in 1972-1981 
19% in 1982-1989 
13% in 1990-1997 
25% in 1998-2001 
ERS USDA (2001b) US 2000 Hedonic regression Crop direct payments Share 20% 
Lence and Mishra 
(2003) 
 
Iowa 1996-2000 Producers’ profit 
maximisation 
Total government 
payments 
Effect of 1$ payment 
on rental: +0.13$ 
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Roberts et al. (2003) US 1992 and 1997 Producers’ profit 
maximisation 
PFC payments without 
conservation payments 
Effect of 1$ payment 
on rental: 
+0.23-0.76$ in 1992, 
+0.33-1.55$ in 1997 
Flanders et al. (2004) Georgia 1967-2002 PVM Total government 
payments 
Evidence of 
capitalisation 
Goodwin et al. (2005) 
(improvement of 
Goodwin et al., 2003) 
US 1998-2001 PVM with non-agricultural 
uses; account for expectations 
by averaging past values 
Total government 
payments 
Effect of 1$ payment 
on land price: +13$ 
Effect of 1$ payment 
on cash rent: +0.35$ 
Effect of 1$ payment 
on share rent: +0.51$ 
Duvivier et al. (2005) Belgium 1980-2001 PVM with different discount 
rates;  account for 
expectations by averaging 
past values 
Crop direct payments Elasticity 0.17-0.34 
depending on year 
Shaik et al. (2005) US 1940-2002 PVM accounting for counter-
cyclicality of payments 
Total government 
payments 
Elasticity 0.35 
Share 30% 
Taylor and Brester 
(2005) 
Montana 1986-1999 Hedonic regression Domestic price of sugar 
beet (kept high due to 
import restrictions) 
Elasticity 0.16 
Latruffe et al. (2006) Czech Republic 1995-2001 PVM with non-agricultural 
uses 
Direct payments Elasticity 0.13 
Shaik et al. (2006) US; Southern vs. other 
states 
1940-2004 PVM accounting for counter-
cyclicality of payments 
Total government 
payments 
Elasticity 0.12 in 2002-
2004 
Share up to 65% in 
Southern states 
PVM: Present value model. PSE: production support estimate. CAP: Common Agricultural Policy. PFC: production flexibility contracts. 
* ‘Elasticity’ means elasticity of land prices with respect to the public program; ‘share’ means share of land prices that can be attributed to the public program. 
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4.  Conclusion 
This article has shown that agricultural production theory allows to derive some general 
insights as regards the impact of various policy instruments on the rental price of farmland. 
These main insights may be summarised as follows: 
- agricultural support policy instruments contribute to increase the rental price of 
farmland; 
- the extent of this increase closely depends on the level of the supply price elasticity of 
farmland relative to those of other factors/inputs on the one hand, the range of the 
possibilities of factor/input substitution in agricultural production on the other hand; 
- whatever the policy instrument, the lower the elasticity of farmland supply, the higher 
the increase in the rental price of farmland; 
- for the output price support instrument, the higher the degree of substitution between 
land and non-land factors/inputs, the lower the extent of land use and land rental price 
increases. At reverse, for the land subsidy instrument, the higher the degree of 
substitution, the greater the extent of land use and land rental price increases; 
- as shown by some authors, an output subsidy will unambiguously have lower impact 
on land rental price than an equal cost land subsidy. In other words, a larger part of 
support is “capitalised” in the rental price of land when this support is provided 
through a land subsidy than through output price support. 
The impact of agricultural policies on the selling price of farmland has very rarely been 
examined from a theoretical point of view. Indeed it is commonly assumed in existing studies 
that the buying and selling prices of farmland can be adequately approximated by the 
discounted sum of future rental prices, so that a prediction about the direction of the rental 
prices is equivalent to a prediction about the direction of the buying and selling prices. As a 
result, most theoretical work has focused on the rental price of farmland. 
The review of empirical literature regarding the impact of agricultural policy on farmland 
values identified several relevant papers written from the late 80es. Despite the wide 
differences between the studies in terms of method and data, one can try to summarise the 
findings in a few main points. 
- Government payments and other types of support (price support, quotas) are 
important in explaining land prices. Not only they are major trends in land prices, 
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but they also account for a large share of the land prices. In general studies agree 
about a share around 15-30%, although it could be up to 70% depending on specific 
regions and dates. 
- Land prices and rents have a significant positive response to government support. 
Although the magnitude of the response varies across studies5, it has almost 
consistently been showed to be less than 1. Such inelastic response is thought to 
reflect the uncertain future of the farm programs. However, there is no consensus 
about whether government payments are discounted more heavily (that is to say, 
are seen as more transitory) than market earnings. Despite this, in general studies 
have indicated that land prices are more responsive to government-based returns 
than to market-based returns. 
Although some contradictions remain among findings from the empirical studies, what 
appears clearly is that part of the payments are capitalised in land prices, implying that 
governments could have partially missed their target of providing income support to farmers. 
It is also clear that the way agents see the policy (credible, transitory) has crucial implications 
for the welfare of farmers. 
                                                 
5 Oltmer and Florax (2001) attempted to compare statistically the findings from 17 different studies reporting 
elasticities of land prices with respect to earnings including farm support. Using meta-analysis based on several 
factors regarding the methodology, the commodity supported, the location, the period and the type of data, they 
found no significant differences between elasticities of land prices with respect to land returns according to the 
methodology used. They also reported that the elasticities with respect to returns in which both price support and 
income support were included, were higher than with respect to returns including only one type of support. 
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